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UN CONSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE [UNCA]:  
AN EMERGENT POLICY INSTITUTION  
 
Vijayashri Sripati* 
I. Introduction 
 
 This essay’s chief purpose is to establish the emergence of the UN’s 
constitutional assistance as a “policy institution.”1 Its overarching argument is that our 
scholarly understanding and imagination of UN constitutional assistance will benefit by 
moving beyond the post-conflict or peace-building tableau.  It contains five parts.   In 
part I, I will define the term “constitution” and sketch out the essential elements of a 
constitution-making process.  In Part II, I will trace the  emergence—in the twenty-first 
                                                 
*Doctoral candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. 
I thank Obiora Okafor, Craig Scott, Ralph Wilde, R. Sudarshan (UNDP) and Professors Peter Russell. 
Wiktor Osiatynski and Martin Doonbros for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.  I am also 
grateful to David Kennedy, Nathanial Berman, Robert Matthews and Tom Tieku (University of Toronto) 
for their valuable feedback.   
 
1 This essay is drawn from my doctoral dissertation titled: United Nations Constitutional Assistance: A 
Historical and Post-Colonial Perspective where I examine the purposes served by UN constitutional 
assistance through the ‘policy institution’/ ‘established practice’ concept, using the methodology of 
“purposive analysis” (based on the official purposes advanced for the projects).  The concept and 
methodology are drawn from Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration – How Trusteeship and 
the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). ‘Policy Institution’ as 
used in Wilde’s teleological study, combines an ‘institution’ as an ‘established practice’ focusing on 
‘policy’, that is, the purposes for which the practice is associated. See ibid. at 36, fn. 99.  See definition 6a 
of “institution” in the Oxford English Dictionary, online Oxford English Dictionary, 
<http://www.oed.com>: 
6. a. An established law, custom, usage, practice, organization,  
or other element in the political or social life of a people… 
For a detailed explanation of this methodology, see Vijaya Sripati, “Introduction,” in The Evolution of the 
UN’s Constitutional Assistance: A Post-colonial and TWAIL Perspective [unpublished doctoral 
dissertation].  “Established practice” is just the ‘institution’ part of Wilde’s definition- and by extension 
mine - of ‘policy institution.’  For UNCA to be a ‘policy institution’ it has to be shown that it [the practice 
of constitutional assistance] has been put to common policy ends.  An in-depth analysis of this theme is 
pursued in  Vijayashri Sripati, “UNCA – A Mechanism for Implementing International Law and Policy” in  
United Nations Constitutional Assistance: A Historical and Post-Colonial Perspective at chapter 5 
(analyzing how UNCA can be understood and is indeed, rationalized and legitimized by the UN as a device 
for implementing international law).  
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century—of UN constitutional assistance as a policy institution and analyze the salient 
features of that body’s constitutional assistance policy. I will argue that, in providing 
constitutional assistance, the UN sets standards for the process of constitution making 
and, broadly, for its contents, thus influencing the constitutional outcome.  In Part III, I 
will explain how the UN slips constitutional assistance into its “development assistance” 
under its “democratic governance” framework.  In Part IV, I will focus on the UN 
Democracy Fund’s (UNDEF) activities and recent UN-sponsored conferences on 
constitution-making to highlight the high-level policy attention that constitutional 
assistance as a democracy-promotion and conflict-resolution tool has received. I will 
conclude by highlighting recent developments that point to the UN’s continued support 
for constitution-making as an integral part of its “work.” 
Part 1 
II. Constitution and Constitution-making: 
  
 The term constitution “refers both to the institutions, practices, and principles that 
define and structure a system of government and to the written document that establishes 
or articulates such a system.”2 By constitution-making, I refer to the processes by which 
new constitutions are written (or rewritten) and to the general outlines of constitutions, as 
opposed to the making of particular laws.  Now, a written constitution has become almost 
an expression of political modernization, for nations, both old and new.3  And, as the 
                                                 
2 See Suzette Hemberger, “Constitution” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), online: <www.oxfordreference.com>  
3For example, governed all along by a 1953 royal decree, Bhutan never had a written constitution.  
However, owing to international demands for “modernization” and domestic compulsions, its King decided 
to give his people a written constitution, which was drafted - with the UNDP’s assistance – and enforced in 
2008.  See “UN’s Constitutional Assistance in Bhutan,” in infra Chapter 3 titled: The Institution of UNCA.  
For similar views see Doctor Miguel Herrero de Minon, “Democratic Transition and Constitutional 
Choices” in Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy ed. Constitution-Making as an 
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spate of “post-conflict” constitution-making suggests, constitutions may also be codified 
in a peace agreement.4  
 
Although constitution-making is today widely recognized and described as an 
“instrument for conflict resolution,”5 it has not been officially defined in UN documents 
or non-official sites.6  However, the UN’s constitutional assistance policy note sets out 
the essential components of and the various steps/stages in a typical constitution-making 
process.7  
                                                                                                                                                 
Instrument of Democratic Transition (Germany: Council of Europe, 1993) at 21 (arguing that a constitution 
is the “instrument and expression of political modernization”); Judge John Tunheim, “Rule of Law and the 
Kosovo Constitution,” (2009) 18 Minn. J. of Int’l L. 371 at 374 (arguing that “it is essential today in any 
new democracy to develop a written constitution that provides the basic guarantees of human rights… ….A 
constitution is essential to enshrine the rule of law.”)    For other allusions to the importance of a 
constitution see e.g. Ulaanbaatar Declaration - Democracy, Good Governance and Civil Society, Outcome 
Documents, The Fifth International Conference, of New or Restored Democracies, Uanbaatar, Mongolia, 
(10-12 September 2003) at ix: 
Recognizing also the foregoing challenges, and …desiring to open up a path for further 
strengthening the global democratic movement by the consolidation of new or restored 
democracies, as well as supporting other states in introducing democratic reforms for the benefit 
of all members of society.  Democracy should be rooted in the Constitution of the State to provide 
permanency and a legal foundation.  
4 The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted as Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
initiated in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995 and came into force with the signing in Paris on 14 
December 1995.  See online: The Dayton Peace Accords, 
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html>. 
5 See Yash Ghai, “The Constitution Reform Process: Comparative Perspectives,” online 
:<http://www.idea.int/news/upload/Nepal%20-%20workshop%20paper%20-%20Yash%20Ghai.pdf>.  
Constitution-making also goes on in other contexts, as occurred in the 1990s, wherein new states arose and 
old states were renovated against the backdrop of the fall of communism and the Soviet Union’s splinter.   
6 The term constitution-making is conspicuous by its absence in the UN “Peacemaker” glossary – a 
“catalogue of current definitions and understandings of terms utilized by the UN within the context of 
international peacemaking.”  The UN “Peacemaker” website is an online mediation support tool created by 
the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) in support of the UN Secretary-General and his 
representatives’ efforts in resolving international disputes and internal conflicts.  However, the listing of 
“Constitution and Political System/structure/Institutions” as one of the thematic issues in the search engine 
for “peace agreements” on this website affirms that constitution-making is an integral part of a peace 
process. See UN Peacemaker at <http://www.peacemaker.unlb.org/advancedrsearch.php>; For peace-
building definition see Agenda for Peace, infra note 24 at ¶ 21 (defining it as “action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict.”); For ‘constitution-building’ definition see Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution Building 
Processes and Democratization (Stockholm: IDEA, 2006) at 9 (defining it as being “more complex than 
the process of constitution-making alone, although the latter is an inseparable part of it.”); See generally 
Vincent Chetail, Postconflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
7 See United Nations Interoffice Memorandum from the Secretary-General, “Guidance Note on United 
Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes” (June 8, 2009) at 2, 6, & 8 (charting out the stages in 
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I.II.1 Constitution-Making: Its Essential Components 
  
 Broadly speaking, recent constitution-making processes have typically begun with 
important stakeholders holding high-level negotiations and deciding in an agreement on 
the path to be taken towards constitution-making.8 Next, a representative body prepares a 
draft constitution usually after a public education and consultation campaign.9 Thereafter, 
an elected constituent power debates, discusses and adopts the draft constitution before it 
is finally adopted either through a referendum or any other procedure.10  Significantly, 
drawing upon foreign expertise and educating the public through an information 
campaign and inviting public participation in the process through public consultations11 
have today evolved as new standards for making constitutions.   
 
I.II.1.1 Forms of Direct UN Constitutional Assistance  
 
 
To begin with, the UN provides financial and logistic support and designs and 
manages the process.12  The UN asserts that it strives to ensure that the process is 
“transparent, inclusive, and participatory.”13 It assists in the creation of constitution-
                                                                                                                                                 
a constitution-making process and the specific tasks undertaken by the UN as part of its constitutional 
assistance).  [Hereinafter UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (2009)] [document on file with the 
author] 
8 Ibid. at 6, 8 (components of a constitution-making process) 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. at  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. at 2 &3.  See UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) at ¶ 7 (a) (“the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), as requested by the Government of Iraq, shall: promote national 
dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq); Report of 
the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004) at ¶ 30 (“To this end, my 
Special Representative and the UNAMI Office of Constitutional Support have held extensive consultations 
with the political leadership, the Constitution Drafting Committee, and members of Iraqi civil society with 
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drafting bodies and election of the constituent bodies such as a constituent assembly.14  It 
describes its assistance during negotiations as “political and strategic support” and 
“political facilitation” of “key contentious” “substantive and procedural issues.”15 It 
rounds off its assistance by providing the local constitution-makers with drafting- 
assistance16 and knowledge-based support and expertise (typically by providing them the 
services of foreign experts),17  and creating and managing a public education and public 
participation campaign by allying with local and/or external NGOs.18     
I.II.1.2 Indirect Influences 
 
 
Constitution-making does not occur in a vacuum.  Indeed, the UN’s 
rationalizing discourses and legitimizing ideologies provide the framework for its 
constitutional assistance activities and serve as backdrops for constitution-making 
processes.  For example, the post-Cold War and the twenty-first century constitution-
making processes of Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Nepal, Bhutan, and Malawi - and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
a view to encouraging an inclusive, participatory and transparent constitution-making process that is 
responsive to the key demands of all Iraqi constituencies”). 
14 Ibid. at 3.  UN documents frequently cover constitutional assistance under the generic term “electoral 
assistance.”  Since constitutional assistance is assistance in writing a constitution, it typically includes 
electoral assistance.  But electoral assistance may not necessarily include constitutional assistance.  For 
example, as we have seen, constitutional assistance is assistance in the making of a constitution and it 
typically comprises assistance to hold free and fair elections to a constituent power such as a constituent 
assembly and maybe even a referendum for the adoption of the constitution.  But electoral assistance might 
only be assistance to hold free and fair elections to constitutional (or post-constitution) bodies such as 
parliaments and/or state legislatures and not a constituent assembly.  
15 Ibid. at 3. Political and strategic support includes assistance in the “negotiation of an initial agreement on 
the structure of the constitution-making process” or “on the selection process for the Drafting Body and the 
Constituent Assembly”. Ibid 
16 Ibid.   Drafting assistance comprises assistance in writing or drafting an array of documents ranging from 
rules of procedure to constitutional provisions and or provisions in the peace agreements.  See e.g. 
Mediation Support Team Job Advertisement, infra note 74. 
17 Ibid. at 3.  Knowledge-based support and expert advice is typically given in the fields of constitutional 
law, constitutional design, and international human rights law, and on matters relating to the state’s treaty 
obligations and domestic effect of international treaties, bills of rights, provisions on judicial independence, 
and constitutionalization of internationally-designed bodies such as national human rights institutions. Ibid.  
18 Ibid. at 3. 
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ongoing processes - have had “good governance” and the “rule of law” as their 
legitimizing ideologies.19    
III. The UN & Internal Governance  
I.III.1 Dismantling the Remnants of Colonialism 
 
Constitution-making is a signature feature of sovereignty and is an expression of a 
people’s right to self-determination.20  In June 1945, even as the UN Charter spoke of 
freedom and self-determination, colonial chains still bound millions around the world and 
compromised these ringing words.  Conceived and crafted broadly by colonialists, the 
                                                 
19 See generally The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, II 6, delivered to the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (defining the rule of law and providing for a series of recommendations for 
negotiations, peace agreements and security council mandates); UNDP, “Governance for Sustainable 
Human Development - A UNDP Policy Document,” online: UNDP < 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicydoc97-e.pdf>; UN, UN Peace 
Mandate (2008); See Rama Mani &Jana Krause, “Democratic Governance” in Vincent Chetail ed., Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 107 (describing how good 
governance entered the international lexicon)  
20 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1. 
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UN Charter betrayed a colonial character.21  It first helped decide the future of territories 
and shape governments in the decolonization context.22          
 
I.III.2 Post-1989/ Peace-Building Context: Constitutional Assistance to Resolve 
Conflicts & Build Peace  
 
However, the UN’s concern with internal governance and by extension, 
constitution-making was not confined to the decolonization context.23  Interestingly, in 
the post-Cold War era, the internal governance of many independent, sovereign, and 
conflicted states riveted its attention.  Empowered by the Security Council, it assisted 
many such states write their constitutions and build new political institutions as a way to 
                                                 
21 See e.g. UN Charter, Art. 73 & 76 (drawing a critical distinction between Non-Self Governing Territories 
(NSGTs)  and Trust Territories (Trusts) where the latter were to eventually transit to freedom under the 
scrutiny of the UN Trusteeship Council but the provisions for NGSTs comprised only a toothless 
“Declaration.”).  Consequently, there are still 16 NSGTs dotting the international landscape today.   Indeed, 
“the term NSGT is in practice a euphemism for colonies.” See El-Ayouti, The UN and Decolonization: The 
Role of Afro-Asia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) at XIX, fn. 1 (citing to Clyde Eagleton, 
International Government).  The UN assisted trust territories to transit to full statehood by supervising and 
certifying (for fairness) the referenda held therein.  In some cases, administering powers renounced 
trusteeship and severed constitutional ties to the territory. Palau, the last UN Trust Territory gained 
independence on 1 October 1994 and the Trusteeship Council suspended operation a month later.  See 
generally Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Support by the United Nations System of 
the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, A/62/296, (23 August 
2007); Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Doc. A.59/565, para 299 and 85 (recommending the use of 
Trusteeship Council as a forum through which Member States could exercise collective trusteeship for the 
global environment).  While the administering states have usually resisted UN involvement with their 
overseas territories, the Decolonization Committee does and can do no more than monitor the process and 
give its opinion.  
22 See e.g. Katy Le Roy, Nauru Constitutional Review: Background and Discussion Paper (June 2006) at 3, 
7, 10-11 (discussing UN’s push for Nauru’s independence and its tangential involvement in its constitution-
making). [Hereinafter Le Roy, Nauru Constitutional Review]. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, A/60/71, (5 October 2005); United Nations, From Dependence to Freedom - The UN Role in 
the Advance of Dependent Peoples toward Self-Government or Independence (New York: United Nations 
Office of Public Information 1976); UN G.A. Res., 742 (VIII) 459th plenary meeting, Factors which 
should be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not 
yet attained a full measure of self-government,  (27 November 1953).  See also Yves Beigbeder, 
International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda, and National Elections 129-43 (1994); Edmund Jan 
Osmańczyk & Anthony Mango, “Plebiscites” in Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International 
Agreements (London: Routledge, 2004) at 1803-1804.    
23 See e.g. Le Roy, Nauru Constitutional Review, supra note 22 at 3, 7, 10-11 (discussing UN’s push for 
Nauru’s independence and its indirect involvement in its constitution-making). [Hereinafter, Roy, Nauru 
Constitutional Review] 
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resolve their conflicts and build peace.24  The then UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for 
Democratization (1996),25 which forms part of the international peace-building discourse 
announced in part as follows:   
 
The peace-keeping mandates entrusted to the United 
Nations now often include both the restoration of 
democracy and the protection of human rights.   United 
Nations departments, agencies and programmes have been 
called upon to help States draft constitutions, create 
independent systems for the administration of justice, 
provide police forces that respect and enforce the rule of 
law, depoliticize military establishments and establish 
national institutions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights. They also have been asked by many States 
engaged in democratization to help encourage and facilitate 
the active participation of citizens in political processes, 
and to foster the emergence of a productive civil society, 
including responsible and independent communications 
media.26  
 
                                                 
24 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, (17 June 1992) [Hereinafter Agenda for Peace]; 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: 
Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 
A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 January 1995 [Hereinafter Supplement to an Agenda for Peace];General Assembly 
Resolution, A/Res/47/120B (20 September 1993) (acknowledging the usefulness of post-conflict peace-
building activities provided that such activities were undertaken on the basis of agreements ending conflicts 
at the request of the governments concerned); “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,” A/50/60 - S/1995/1 
(25 January 1995) at 49-50 ¶ (acknowledging that peace agreements can provide the legal basis for UN’s 
intervention in post-conflict situations and its peace-building activities); Thierry Tardy, ed., Peace 
Operations after 11 September 2001 (London: Frank Cass, 2004) (covering the proceedings of a workshop 
held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy which addressed the issue of peace operations in a post-9/11 
context and was titled: The Brahimi Report: Four Years On).    
25Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations, 1996) 
[Democratization Agenda]; Report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Development, A/48/935 (6 
May 1994) at ¶124 (declaring that “UN support has also been provided for drafting constitutions, instituting 
administrative and financial reforms, strengthening domestic human rights laws….). 
26 See ibid. at para 5 [emphasis added].  Beginning from the 1990s, the UN embraced conflict prevention or 
conflict resolution as its chief responsibility under the Charter and accordingly, stressed the importance of 
devising mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts.  It was in this context of a culture of prevention that 
constitutional assistance as a conflict prevention mechanism first gained traction in UN policy circles.  See 
also infra note 107 
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Almost a decade later, the UN reiterated constitutional assistance as an integral 
part of its “work.”  For instance, in his 2005 “Report on the Work of the Organization,” 
the then Secretary-General stated: 
 
The UN worked tirelessly around the globe throughout the 
year to prevent and resolve conflicts and to consolidate 
peace. From Afghanistan to Burundi, from Iraq to the 
Sudan, from Haiti to the Middle East, the tools employed 
were as diverse as the circumstances.  My envoys used 
their good offices in seeking peace agreements or in trying 
to prevent disputes from violently escalating.  Peacekeepers 
deployed to conflict zones in record numbers and in 
complex multidimensional operations working not only to 
provide security … and to help war-torn countries, write 
constitutions, hold elections and strengthen human rights 
and the rule of law. United Nations agencies, funds and 
programmes tailored their assistance to the special needs of 
post-conflict societies.27 
 
 
The UN has provided constitutional assistance to the following countries (listed 
alphabetically): Afghanistan28, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, East-Timor 
(decolonization context)29, Eritrea, Gautemala30, Kosovo, Mozambique, Namibia 
(decolonization context), Liberia, Sierra Leone,31 and Sudan.  It has offered constitutional 
                                                 
27 Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, General Assembly, Official Records, 
Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/60/1) (2005) at para 10 [emphasis added]; Report of the Secretary-
General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616 (23 
August 2004) at ¶ 12 (“our (peace) operations have helped national actors … draft new constitutions, revise 
legislation, inform and educate the public, develop ombudsman institutions, and human rights 
commissions… justice sector.”).   
28 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan or UNAMA is a political mission headed by the representative of 
the UN Secretary-General. 
29 For the UN’s involvement in constitution-making in the decolonization context see e.g. Katy Le Roy, 
Nauru Constitutional Review, supra note 23.  
30 See Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime, 1996, online: 
www.guatemala.se/static/h249n2fls31o828.../guatemala.../peace8.pdf>; Agreement on a Firm and Lasting 
Peace, online: www.guatemala.se/static/h249n2fls31o828.../guatemala.../peace1.pdf>; Rajeev Pillay, 
Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries: Case Study Gautemala (undated). 
31 See Statement submitted by the Civil Society Peacebuilding Engagement Committee 
(CSPEC) Sierra Leone to the High-Level Stakeholders Consultation on the Implementation of the Sierra 
Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (Compact): United Nations, New York, (19 May 08), online: 
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<www.wanep.org/images/sl_cso_statement.pdf> (reporting that the constitutional review has been 
completed and the Commission has submitted its report to the Cabinet); Peace-building Commission, 
Conclusions and recommendations of the second biannual review of the implementation of the Sierra 
Leone Peace-building Cooperation Framework, PBC/3/SLE/2,  (16 December 2008) at ¶ 6 (recommending 
that the government of Sierra Leone should undertake a constitutional review exercise and ensure adequate 
follow-up to the report of the Constitutional Review Commission by holding consultations and raising 
awareness of its findings nationwide”);“Sierra Leone Compact, The United Nations Peace-building 
Commission and the Republic of Sierra Leone Framework for Cooperation: Building on Progress” (May 4, 
2007), online: www.peacebuildingcommission.org/files/index.php?act...id=121 (stating that one of the 
strategies of the Sierra Leone Compact was to “intensify efforts to ensure an inclusive and participatory 
legislative and constitutional reform processes”); “Peace-building Commission adopts recommendations 
for Government of Sierra Leone, United Nations, international partners; outlines commission’s future role,” 
(12 June 2008) online: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-7FS3NA?OpenDocument> 
(reporting that UNISOIL had been replaced with an “integrated peace-building office” in Sierra Leone and 
that the Cabinet had just received a report on the ongoing constitutional review process, paving the way for 
the next stage of consultations, which was expected to involve members of civil society”); Sierra Leone, 
UN’s Joint Vision, Supporting Sierra Leone: A Joint Vision of the UN’s Family at 2, online: 
<www.sl.undp.org/1_doc/joint_un_vsion_sl_final.pdf> (“we will continue promoting the rule of law, the 
rights of marginalized groups, women and children, and assist in the review of Sierra Leone’s 
Constitution”); Second Report of the Secretary-General on the UN-Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, 
S/2006/695, (29 August 2006) at ¶ 9 (reporting that the Sierra Leone President had informed UNISOIL of 
his government’s intention to amend the 1991 constitution which will be included on the ballot for a 
referendum during the 2007 elections and that the “Law Review Commission of Sierra Leone had already 
started reviewing the 1991 Constitution to ensure that it reflects the new political, social, and economic 
reality in the country”); UN Department of Public Information, “Security Council extends mandate of 
Sierra Leone Office until 30 September 2008 unanimously adopting resolution 1793 (2007),” SC/9212 (21 
December 2007) online: <http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2007/SC9212.doc.htm> (reporting that when 
UNIOSIL’s mandate expires in September 2008, it be replaced by a leaner integrated political office, that 
would focus on carrying forward the peace-consolidation process, mobilizing international donor support, 
supporting the work of the Peace-building Commission and the Peace-building Fund and completing any 
residual tasks left over from UNIOSIL’s mandate, particularly promoting national reconciliation and 
supporting the constitutional reform process.”); Lotta Teale, “The Review of the Constitution: What the 
Report Says and Should Sierra Leone Make These Changes?” (May 9, 2007), online: 
<http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/articles/The_Review_of_the_Constitution_What_the_Report_Says_and_
Should_Sierra_Leone_Make_These_Changes.shtml> (reporting that the report of the Constitutional 
Review Committee was published in April 2007, with proposals for changes to the Constitution of Sierra 
Leone and that there is talk of a referendum); Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, S/2008/281 (29 April 2008) at ¶ 28 titled “Enhancing Democratic 
Governance” (affirming the UN’s constitutional assistance), at ¶39 F (stating that the constitution review 
commission submitted its report on 10 January 2008 that recommended the amendment of  the entrenched 
provisions in the constitution that will require national approval by referendum); “UN Peace-building 
Office (UNIPSIL) to replace UNIOSIL,” online: < http://english.grioo.com/ar,un_peace-
building_office_unipsil_to_replace_uniosil,71.html> (stating that the UN Security Council will establish a 
United Nations peace-building office (UNIPSIL) as approved by the UN Security Council Resolution 1829 
to replace the United Nations Integrated Office (UNIOSIL) (2008) 1 October 2008); First report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), 
S/2009/59, (30 January 2009) at ¶ 53-54 (affirming UNIPSIL’s willingness to provide constitutional 
assistance to the government) ;For information on what a UN peace-building office is see Secretary-
General’s Note on the Peace-building Office, online:< 
www.peacewomen.org/un/women_reform/PBC/PBSO_SG_note.pdf; Peace-Building Commission, 
Conference Room Paper for the country specific meeting on Sierra Leone, PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1 (10 October 
2006) at ¶ 14 (stating that a national referendum on amendments to the constitution will take place 
following the constitutional review by the Law Reform Commission to ensure the constitution reflects the 
new political, social, and economic reality in the country); See generally UNISIOL, online< 
http://www.uniosil.org/>. 
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assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, and Somalia through its special political 
missions32 and to the Central African Republic,33 Guinea-Bissau,34 and Coite d’Ivoire 
through its Peace-building Support Offices and Mediation Support Unit.35 
                                                 
32 Special Political Missions [SPMs] have not been legislatively defined.  For comments on the need to 
articulate a clearer definition of SPMs and better present their programmatic and budgetary requirements 
see reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) A/63/593 
and A/63/601.  UN member states have also emphasized the need for articulating the modalities for their 
creation.  See e.g. “Budget Committee takes up proposed $467 million in financing for 27 political 
missions in 2009” (16 December 2008), online: ReliefWeb < 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/KSAI-7ME4A8?OpenDocument> (reproducing the  
Japanese representative’s call to the Secretary-General to clarify “what special political missions are”); 
Interview of Peter Barwick, UN Mediation Support Unit, by V. Sripati (October 8, 2008). [on file]  The 
defining feature of special political missions is their lack of a military component.  Being “late-stage 
follow-up” kinds of missions, they are centered on assisting countries in “negotiating” political settlements 
and thereby have constitutional assistance as one of their key functions.  They are authorized either by the 
General Assembly and/or the Security Council.  Ibid.   
33 See Report of the Secretary-General, The Situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of 
the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic, S/2004/ 496 (16 June 
2004) at ¶ 3 (reporting that the financial support of CAR’s foreign partners was indispensable to 
implementing its transitional government’s electoral schedule), ¶ 11 (“BONUCA and the UN family are 
assisting the Transitional Authorities inter alia in the drafting of … the constitution and the ordinance on 
political parties”); Department of Political Affairs, “Implementation of the Bruxelles Programme of Action 
for Least developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010” at 1, 2, online: <http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/UN%20system%20%20DPA%20doc.pdf >, (stating that the UN Secretary-General 
established the UN Peace-Building Support Office in Bangui (BONUCA) and that the DPA assisted the 
country in managing the constitutional crisis during 2001-2002).   The Central African Republic adopted a 
new constitution by referendum on 5 December 2004. 
34 See UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1216 (21 December 1998) (requesting that the Secretary-
General recommend a possible role for the UN in Guinea-Bissau’s peace process); UN Security Council 
Resolution S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) (supporting the decision of the UN Secretary-General to establish 
the UN Peace-building support office in Guinea-Bissau); UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1580 (22 
December 2004) (revising and extending the mandate of the UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-
Bissau – UNOGBIS); UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1216 (21 December 1998); UN Security 
Council Resolution, S/Res/1876 (26 June 2009) at XII A¶ (extending the mandate of UNOGBIS until 
31 December and requesting the Secretary-General to establish a UN Integrated Peace-building Office in 
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to succeed UNOGBIS for an initial period of 12 months after that so that it 
may take up key tasks including “strengthening the capacities of national institutions in order to maintain 
the constitutional order, … and full respect for the rule of law”); Report of the Secretary-General on 
developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of UN Peace-Building Support Office in that country, 
S/2008/751, (2 December 2008) at ¶ 21 (“the need to review and formulate existing and new legislation, 
including constitutional frameworks, was also underlined”); Report of the Secretary-General on 
developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of UN Peace-Building Support Office in that country, 
S/2000/362, (28 June 2000) at ¶ 9 (stating that the Guinea-Bissau “authorities have stated the need for a 
new post-conflict constitution”) at ¶ 20 (“endemic poverty remains the single most debilitating social and 
economic problem threatening the consolidation of democracy and the constitutional order”); Report of the 
Secretary-General on Guinea Bissau and on the activities of UNOGBIS as of 11 June 2009, S/2009/302 (10 
June 2009); Report of the Mission to Guinea-Bissau of the PeaceBuilding Commission’s Country-Specific 
Configuration on Guinea-Bissau (6-11 April, 2008) at ¶ 24 (emphasizing the privatization and other 
reforms recommended and undertaken by the World Bank in Guinea-Bissau) online: < 
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/GuineaBissau.pdf>; Priority Plan for the UN Peace-building Fund 
(PBF) – Guinea Bissau (June 2008). 
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I.III.3 Into the 21st Century: Emergence of UN Constitutional Assistance as a Policy 
Institution  
 
 
UN constitutional assistance first received high-level policy attention in 2000 due to 
the work of the Brahimi panel on peace operations.36  However, that concept was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Brahimi report.37  But according to Dean Brian Atwood, 
“there was no question that the panel’s members - in their report - alluded to 
constitutional and other forms of assistance rendered by the UN in the peace-building 
context.”38  In addition, members discussed the importance of requiring all UN-assisted 
constitution-making processes to be “transparent, inclusive, and participatory.”39  
Although technically speaking, “electoral assistance” does not include constitutional 
assistance,40 Dean Atwood concludes - and I concur, - that the Brahimi Report, akin to 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 See UN Department of Political Affairs Mediation Support Unit Project Proposal & Programme of Work 
2008 (version dated 2 January 2008 on file with the author).  The UN Mediation Support Unit has also been 
involved in constitutional matters in Myanmar and Bolivia. Ibid. at 7 & 11-12.   See e.g. UNDP Bolivia, 
“Supporting consensus-building processes for the installation of the Constituent Assembly” (undated), 
online: <www.democraticdialoguenetwork.org/file.pl?files_id=320;folder>. For the most recent 
“Background Note” (current facts and figures) see online: “UN Political and Peace-building Missions,” (31 
March 2009) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf> 
36 See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 -S/2000/809, 21 August 2000 
[Hereinafter Brahimi Report].  The then Secretary-General Kofi Annan created this 10-member panel 
which was chaired by the veteran Algerian diplomat Mr. Lakhder Brahimi.  Therefore, it is widely known 
as the Brahimi panel and its report is called the Brahimi Report.   
37 For tangential references to constitutional assistance in the Brahimi Report, see Brahimi Report supra 
note 36 at ¶ 30 (long-term conflict prevention) & 35-38 (peace-building strategies including electoral 
assistance).   
38 Interview of Brian Atwood, Dean, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, by V. 
Sripati (March 12, 2009) (on file).  In fact, the UN’s electoral and constitutional assistance experience in 
countries like Namibia and Cambodia was discussed by the panel as it considered different elements of 
peace-building. Ibid. Mr. Brian Atwood who formerly headed the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was one of the members on this panel.   For a complete list of this panel’s members 
see Brahimi Report supra note 36 at 48 (Annex 1). 
39 Interview of Mr. Brian Atwood, supra note 38    
40 See text of supra note 14. 
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other UN reports and policy documents, uses a broad definition of “electoral assistance” 
to cover for constitutional assistance.41   
 
 
Constitutional assistance, as a stand-alone topic, appeared formally and explicitly 
on the UN policy-making radar screen only in 2005, – long after the organization had 
first begun supporting constitution-making.  The UN Secretary-General’s Policy 
Committee prepared and circulated for internal consideration, a policy paper on this 
theme.42  According to Dr. Jamal Benomar, the UN’s constitutional assistance policy was 
finalized and endorsed by this high-level committee in 2006.43  Subsequently, the UN 
took stock of its existing constitutional assistance capacities44 and drawing from its past 
lessons, prepared and circulated a policy note for guidance within the UN ranks.45  This 
policy note was updated in 2009 by the UN Secretary-General46 and it is the UN’s current 
official policy on the topic.47   
 
The UN Constitutional Assistance Policy 
                                                 
41 Interview of Mr. Brian Atwood, supra note 38  
42 See Report of the Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, A/60/891 18 
July 2006 at ¶ 91 (mentioning the creation of the Policy Committee in 2005); “Security Council Report 
Special Report No. 2” (5 October 2007) at 2 online: <www.securitycouncilreport.org> (reporting that an 
“internal” policy paper on constitutional reform and constitution-making was awaiting approval by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Policy Committee) 
43 Interview of Jamal Benomar, Director, Rule of Law Unit, United Nations Headquarters, New York, by 
V. Sripati (January 28, 2009) (on file)  
44 See e.g. UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General, “Inventory - UN Capacity in Peace-Building” 
(September 2006) at 75 (constitution-making), annex 4 at 110-115 (constitution-making), 103-109 (good 
offices and mediation) and 86-102 (human rights) online: 
<www.undp.org/cpr/iasc/content/docs/Oct_Links/doc_4.pdf>. 
45 See UN Guidance Note on Constitution-making (undated).  [Policy document on file with the author].  
The policy is however not cast in stone and some aspects of it are subject to periodic revision.  [Hereinafter 
UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (undated)] 
46 See UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (2009), supra note 7 at 3, fn.1 (stating that it grew 
from an “internal consultation process review undertaken in 2009 to revise the original note published in 
2006”).  In updating this constitutional assistance policy note, the UN Secretary-General was guided by his 
earlier note on rule of law assistance: United Nations Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, “UN 
Approach to Rule of Law Assistance.”  Ibid. at 2 (summary). 
47 This policy note is a “living document” and will be updated periodically. Ibid. at 3. 
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I.III.4 Its Guiding Principles and Framework 
 
 
The UN regards constitution-making processes as crucial opportunities to build 
and consolidate “sustainable peace” and prevent (future) conflicts.48  It submits that it 
assists countries to write their constitutions only at their request.49 And that such 
assistance flows from the understanding that constitution-making is quintessentially a 
“sovereign national process,” whose success and legitimacy rests on it being nationally-
owned and led.50  Significantly, it considers how a constitution is made as equally 
important as its design and content.51  Therefore, ensuring that a constitution-making 
process is “inclusive, participatory, and transparent” and that the (resultant) constitution 
is rooted in “international human rights and other norms and standards” are its core twin 
goals.52  In short, it envisions (its) constitutional assistance as both, an international 
standard-setting and standard-implementing mechanism.53 It therefore considers it 
legitimate to “speak out” when a draft constitution does not comply with international 
standards.54  According to the UN, the local context shapes its constitutional assistance 
                                                 
48 See UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (2009), supra note 7 at 1 (¶ 1), 2 (“For the United 
Nations, constitution-making is a broad concept that covers the process of drafting and substance of a new 
constitution or reforms of an existing constitution”) & 3.   
49 Ibid. at 1 (¶ 3).  I argue that this statement conceals more than it reveals.  This point is revisited later in 
my dissertation but at this point it is sufficient to see infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.  
50 Ibid. at 1 (para 3). 
51 Ibid. at 2 (summary) 
52 Ibid. at 2 (summary) & 4 ¶ 2     
53 Ibid. at 4 ¶ 2; Ibid at UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (undated), supra note 45 at 2. 
54 These standards may concern administration of justice, transitional justice, electoral systems and a range 
of other constitutional issues. Ibid. at 4 ¶ 2.  See generally UN Security Council Resolution on Women, 
Peace and Security, S/RES/1325 (2000), online: Security Council Resolutions 
<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm> (urging member States to ensure increased representation of 
women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for 
the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict); United Nations, Women, Peace and Security: 
Study Submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (New York: 
United Nations, 2000); UN Security Council Resolution, S/Res/1432, (12 July 2002) (referring to - but not 
delineating - the “standards of a modern democracy”)  
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program and it therefore does not advocate a “one size fits all” constitutional model or 
process.55 
 
International Standard-setting 
 
Standard-setting for constitution-making first began in the peace-building context when 
peace agreements: both the processes by which they were negotiated and their substance 
began to be normatively addressed by international law.56   
I.III.4.1 Human Rights 
 
For example, to address the exclusion of women from all phases of formalized 
peace processes,57  the UN Security Council in 2000 called upon all the relevant actors 
when negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt measures that ensure the 
                                                 
55 See UN Constitutional Assistance Guidance Note (2009), supra note 7 at 4.  
56 International standards comprise UN guidelines, guidelines and recommendations of the secretary-
general, and Security Council resolutions. See Brahimi Report, supra note 36 at ¶58 (recommending 
empowering the UN to put conditions on peace agreements in which it will be involved, including ensuring 
the  presence of adviser-observers at peace negotiations); Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 
S/RES/1325 (2000) (31 October 2000) (highlighting the importance of bringing gender perspectives to the 
center of all UN conflict prevention and resolution efforts and peace-building, and reconstruction 
efforts);United Nations, Women, Peace and Security – Study Submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (New York: United Nations, 2002) [hereinafter Women, Peace, 
and Security]; UN Press Release SG/SM/7257, Secretary-General Comments on Guidelines Given to 
Envoys (Dec. 10, 1999) (noting the issuance of guidelines addressing human rights and peace 
negotiations); UN Comm’n on Hum Rts., Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 
[hereinafter Principles to Combat Impunity]; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/616 ¶ 9-10 & 64-65 (3 August 
2004) (providing for a series of recommendations for negotiations, peace agreements, and Security Council 
mandates); A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 103, 226-228; 264, online: 
<http://www.un.org/secureworld/>.  For “Paris Principles” or “Principles relating to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights” see Fact Sheet No.19, 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (28 December 1993), online: 
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), < 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm >. Although these principles did not evolve in the peace-
building context, they have hugely influenced the shaping of human rights institutions in the post-conflict 
context. 
57 Peace processes typically go through many stages including negotiations, the formulation of peace 
accords and reconstruction plans.  
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protection of and respect for the human rights of women and girls, particularly as they 
relate to the constitution and the electoral system.58  Subsequently, a UN Study 
recommended that constitutional processes should include the participation of women 
and principles of gender equality and non-discrimination should be considered during 
constitution-making and constitutionalized thereafter.59 It also recommended the adoption 
of various measures, including quotas to ensure the equitable participation of women in 
electoral processes.60  In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the potent international 
security measures legislated by the Security Council to counter terrorism functioned as 
(post-9/11) standards for both domestic criminal law and constitutional content.61 
                                                 
58 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325 (2000) (31 October 2000) at ¶ 8 (b) & (c)  
59 See Women, Peace, and Security Study, supra note 56 at 126-127.  See also UN Constitutional 
Assistance Guidance Note (2009), supra note 7 at 2 (advocating that “the principle of equality between 
men and women should be embedded in constitutions.”)¶  
60 See Women, Peace, and Security Study, supra note 56 at 111 (para 340), 126 -127.  This study was 
undertaken in response to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security 
and to recommend measures for its full implementation.  
61 UN Security Council Resolution 1373, S/Res/1363 (28 September 2001) (“deciding” that states will have 
to reform domestic laws in many ways including criminalizing the collection of funds to be used in terrorist 
acts) [emphasis added]; UN Security Council Resolution 1455, S/Res/1455 (17 January 2003); See e.g. 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2004) Ch. 1 art. 7 (“the state prevents all types of 
terrorist activities, production and consumption of intoxicants (muskirat), production and smuggling of 
narcotics”) [emphasis added]; Constitution of Iraq, 2005, Section 1(Fundamental Principles), art. 7 (“First: 
No entity or program, under any name, may adopt racism, terrorism, the calling of others infidels, ethnic 
cleansing, or incite, facilitate, glorify, promote, or justify thereto, especially the Saddamist Baath in Iraq 
and its symbols, regardless of the name that it adopts.  This may not be part of the political pluralism in 
Iraq.  This will be organized by law.”] [emphasis added].  The UN’s Policy Working Group on the UN and 
Terrorism (UNPWG) recommended that “states should be encouraged to view the implementation of 
UNSCR 1373 as an instrument of democratic governance and statecraft” and that “model legislation” could 
be developed and advice provided to member states to “ensure that existing laws designed to fight domestic 
terrorism are amended in order to ensure their effectiveness against terrorism.”  Ibid. at Report of the Policy 
Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, at Part V (Recommendations) ¶ 14-15 [emphasis 
added]. [hereinafter UNPWG Report] For other recommendations of the UNPWG focusing on the role of 
IFIs see ibid at III C ¶ 38-41 (Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts); online: 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2002/un-wrkng-grp-terrorism-denial.htm>; See 
generally Kim Lane Schepple, “The Migration of constitutional ideas: the post-9/11 globalization of public 
law and the international state of emergency” in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 347-373; Paul Sasz, “The Security Council Starts 
Legislating,” (2002) 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 901; Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); See Vera Gowland, "The Functions of the United Nations Security Council 
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I.III.4.2 B. Financial Standards 
 
Peace-building involves everything, from disarming armed groups to designing 
economies, to speeding up foreign investment, to sculpting constitutions, to formulating 
new national laws and ‘national development frameworks,’ to fighting corruption and 
promoting “good governance.”  As dominant financiers of post-conflict reconstruction62 
and development assistance, the political economy philosophy underpinning International 
Financial Institutions’ [IFIs] prescriptive policies or [international financial] 
“standards,”63 have become an integral (though implicit) part of the UN’s standards for 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the International Legal System", in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 305 at 307. 
62 For a good critique of IFIs’ intrusive role in post-conflict reconstruction see Kristen Boon, “'Open for 
Business': International Financial Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform and the Rule of Law” 
(2006) 39 N.Y.U. J. of Int’l L & Politics 513 (focusing on Iraq, Afghanistan & East-Timor); Jonathan 
Goodhand, Conflict Assessments – A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal, and Sri Lanka 
(London: The Conflict Security & Development Group, Center for Defense Studies, King’s College, 
London, 2001) (arguing that IFIs who have had a strong “signaling effect” in Nepal have set the 
“framework for development assistance and the hierarchy of priorities” there including the adoption of the 
market economy model). See also Astri Suhrke et al., Peace Processes and State-building: Economic and 
Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2007) (surveying a sample 
of 27 peace agreements since 1989 to analyze their provisions relating to economic recovery and reform 
and to highlight the role of international aid agencies in their making); John Darby & Roger Mac Ginty, 
“Introduction: What Peace? What Process?” in John Darby & Roger Mac Ginty eds., Contemporary 
Peacemaking – Conflict, Peace Processes, and Post-war Reconstruction (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 
2008) 1 at 5 (affirming that neo-liberal economic norms are the pillars supporting Western-backed post-
conflict reconstruction programs; “indeed, international reconstruction assistance is usually explicitly 
linked to an acceptance of World Bank and IMF stipulations”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women, its causes and consequences, “Political Economy of Women’s Human Rights,” 
A/HRC/11/6, (18 May 2009); David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry 
into the magnitude of Neo-liberalism (2000) 63 Law & Contemp Problems 83-109; See generally David 
Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules & Democracy’s Promise 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  For an important role envisioned for IFIs even in the 
eradication of terrorism see UNPWG Report, supra note 61 at Part V (Recommendations), ¶ 17 (“a 
network involving the United Nations system and the Bretton Woods institutions should be created to help 
Member States (in particular those needing greater assistance) to implement the recommendations of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee”). 
63 IFIs here refer to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).  See Gerrit W. Gong, “Standards of Civilization Today” in Mehdi Mozaffari, eds. Globalization & 
Civilization (London: Routledge, 2002) 77 at 85-94.  See generally Gerrit W. Gong, Standard, The 
Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Brett Bowden 
& Leonard Seabroke eds. Global Standards of Market Civilization (London: Routledge, 2006).  For a list of 
Least Developed Countries [LDCs] see <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list>. For criteria of the 
identification of LDCs see <http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm>.  See Report of 
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constitutional content.64  The international financial standards for internal reform and 
restructuring cover the design and implementation of fiscal and monetary policy and 
institution building.  They also include the adoption and application of a market-based 
capitalist economic system (free market reforms), private property rights coupled with 
fair judicial mechanisms for their enforcement, liberalization of trade, protection of 
intellectual property, privatization, and general accounting principles.65   
 
Cumulatively, through these standards and the activities that collectively 
constitute - a pre-designed package of - its (constitutional) assistance, the UN arguably 
influences, both constitution-making processes66 and their constitutional outcomes.  
Consequently, UN-assisted constitution-making processes and their resultant 
constitutions share some common features. 67   
                                                                                                                                                 
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, “political economy of 
women’s rights”, A/HRC/11/6 (18 May 2009) at ¶ (arguing that the neoliberal policy environment has 
undermined women’s rights and created new inequalities).  
64 See text of pages 22-23 (for a discussion on the involvement of IFIs in framing the national development 
frameworks); See generally 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, online: 
<http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033_international_community_aid/paris_declaration.pdf> 
(referring to an emerging international consensus on concepts and approaches to fragile states, many of 
which apply to post-conflict situations).  
65 See Gong, “Standards of Civilization Today” in Mozaffari, Globalization & Civilization, supra note 63, 
77 at 86-87, 90-92.  See generally “POGAR, Programme on Governance in the Arab region,” 
online:<www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=4&cid=6> (providing detailed information on the UN’s 
constitutional and parliamentary reform assistance and attendant fiscal reforms in the Arab region such as 
Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan).   For the World Bank’s active role in the reform of bankruptcy law, banking 
law, tax law, property rights, corporate governance, and financial sector laws see “Law Reform,” online: 
The World Bank, Law Reform, <http://go.worldbank.org/X5EBV66IP0>; “Rule of Law Reform in Post-
Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learned,” online: The World Bank, Justice Reform 
in Fragile States, <http://go.worldbank.org/MB6Z0CUII0>.  
66 For the UN’s TIP-standard regarding how to make a constitution see supra note 13; The Government of 
Rwanda – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (2002) at 58 (“Constitutional Reform: To consult the 
population in the development of the new constitution).  
67 For details on this see Vijayashri Sripati, “The Institution of UN Constitutional Assistance” in United 
Nations Constitutional Assistance: A Historical and Post-Colonial Perspective (unpublished dissertation) 
at Chapter 3. 
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I.IV.3. UN Constitutional Assistance: Development of Institutional Basis & 
Strengthening of (UN’s) Capacities 
 
The momentum at the policy-making front rippled outward to strengthen the 
institutional basis for, as well as the UN’s capacities in, constitutional assistance.  By the 
time the UN’s constitutional assistance policy was worked out and finally endorsed, the 
UN Peace-building Commission (PBC)68 and the Mediation Support Unit (within the 
Department of Political Affairs - DPA) were created.69  The idea that constitutional 
assistance - though carried out by an array of UN entities70 - is a distinct activity which 
requires for its effective provision, the consolidation of expertise in diverse areas71 
through a focal-point72 led to the creation of the Rule of Law Research Group [hereinafter 
Group] and a Rule of Law unit in 2007.73   
                                                 
68 The PBC was established in 2005 as a subsidiary body of the Security Council.  See generally online: 
“Peacebuilding Commission,” <http://www.pbc.org>  
69 Interview of Jamal Benomar, supra note 43. This development resulted from the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome wherein UN member states resolved to support the UN’s good offices capacity, including in the 
mediation of disputes.  See World Summit Outcome Document, UN Gen. Ass. Res. A/RES/60/1 (24 
October 2005) at ¶ 76. 
70 Interview of Jamal Benomar, supra note 43.  The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNIFEM are other 
members of the UN family that are involved in constitution-making and/or engaged in providing 
constitutional assistance. See Ibid.   
71 Providing effective constitutional assistance typically requires expertise in political facilitation, legal 
services, human rights, governance reform and public information.  Ibid. at interview of Jamal Benomar, 
supra note 43. 
72 Interview of Jamal Benomar, supra note 43.  
73 See Interview, ibid.  See UN Department of Public Information, Deputy Secretary-General DSG/SM/420 
GA/L/3345 “United Nations Working to Enhance Delivery of Rule of Law Assistance to Member States, 
Deputy Secretary-General tells Sixth Committee” (14 October 2008), online: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/dsgsm420.doc.htm>; Veronica Taylor, “UN establishes Rule of 
Law Unit” (Nov. 4, 2007) in Law and Development Blog, online: 
<http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/lawdevelopment/2007/11/un-establishes-.html>; Executive Office of the 
Secretary-General, “United Nations Interoffice Memorandum - Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: 
United Nations Approach to Rule of Law Assistance” (14 April 2008), online: < 
http://www.undg.org/docs/9867/SG-memo-on-RoL-Guidance-Note-14Apr08.pdf>  (explaining that the 
Group was an inter-agency mechanism created as a follow-up to the 2005 World Summit for coordinating 
system-wide attention on the rule of law and the Guidance Note - attached to the interoffice memo- grew 
from consultations among experienced rule of law specialists in the organization); Uniting our strengths: 
Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/636–
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The UN’s constitutional assistance program received further impetus with the 
launch of a full-time Standby Team of Mediation Experts in March 2008.74  Comprising 
internationally acclaimed experts in constitution-making, constitutional arrangements and 
power-sharing, and ceasefires and transitional justice, this team is now at the ready to 
swoop down into a given conflict-ridden area to help resolve the crisis there.75  The idea 
                                                                                                                                                 
S/2006/980, (14 December 2006) at 7, fn. 4 & 16, fn.8 (affirming that the Rule of Law Coordination and 
Resource Group will “at the request of member states” “coordinate the UN’s constitutional assistance”). 
74 See UN Press Conference, Dept. of Public Information, “Press Conference to Launch United Nations 
Standby Team of Mediation Experts” (5 March 2008), online: < 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080305_Pascoe.doc.htm> (reporting that while the program’s 
initial term was one year, it would be eventually extended); “Top UN Mediation Team now on Call for 
Crises around the World” (5 Mar. 2008), online: UN News Service 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25866&Cr=diplomacy&Cr1>. For a description of the 
professional duties of the UN Standby Team Members, see “Deadline: Senior Mediation Experts UN 
DPA/MSU” (Closing date: 30 September 2007) online: 
<http://peacemakers.ca.etherwork.net/bulletins/?p=651>: 
“We are seeking a team leader to … draft or participate in the drafting of  
relevant necessary documents, including peace agreements;  
We are seeking senior mediation experts in: 
… constitution-making in the context of comprehensive peace agreements; 
Main Role and responsibilities: 
The main responsibility of the mediation expert is to assist and  
support the mediation team, the observers and the parties to the mediation by: 
• Providing technical expertise and advice within the area of expertise; 
• As necessary and appropriate, participate in the mediation talks and  
contributing to the drafting of relevant sections of the peace agreements and  
other documents;…. [emphasis added]. 
For a brief description of the MSU projects see remarks of Under-Secretary-General, H.E. Ambassador 
Ibrahim Gambari, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Summary Note, “Operational  Conflict 
Prevention” (New York: United Nations, September 2006) at 8.  
75 UN Press Conference, Dept. of Public Information, “Press Conference to Launch United Nations 
Standby Team of Mediation Experts” (5 March 2008), online: < 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080305_Pascoe.doc.htm>;“Top UN Mediation Team now on 
Call for Crises around the World” (5 Mar. 2008), online: UN News Service 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25866&Cr=diplomacy&Cr1>( the “UN Mediation 
Team” in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs comprises the following members Joyce Neu (United 
States), Jeffrey Mapendere (Zimbabwe), Patrick Gavigan (United States & Ireland) John McGarry 
(Canada) and Andrew Ladley (New Zealand) and is financed for its first year by the Norwegian 
government). For major UN documents and/or reports alluding to the UN’s role in constitution-making and 
constitutional assistance functions by calling for strengthening its mediation and conflict prevention 
capacities, see UN General Assembly Resolution 57/337 (July 18, 2003) (calling for strengthening the 
capacity of the UN’s capacity for “early warning, collection of information and analysis”); UN General 
Assembly Resolution 61/230 (22 December 2006) (recognizing the important role of the good offices of the 
Secretary-General in Africa and encouraging the Secretary-General to use mediation as often as possible to 
solve conflicts); Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST, Aug. 2007 (spurring the Secretary-
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behind this initiative was to have a reserve of experts on call, so political disputes do not 
erupt into violence, or if violence has already broken out, to manage ceasefire 
negotiations.   
 
On the human rights front, the endorsement of the UN constitutional assistance policy 
spurred the creation of “best practices” in constitution-making from a human rights 
perspective.  The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
therefore began work on a “tool” to enhance its capacity (both in the field and at its 
headquarters) in supporting constitution-making.76  To effectively engage other UN 
agencies in this process and to get input from those both inside and outside of 
OHCHR77 it recently held a seminar on constitution-making.78   
                                                                                                                                                 
General to improve the Secretariat’s early warning, mediation support and other preventive activities in 
Africa and around the world”); Security Council Resolution 1625 (2005) (calling upon the Secretary-
General to assist countries at risk of armed conflict in performing strategic conflict risk assessments, in 
implementing the measures agreed by the concerned countries, in enhancing national dispute management 
capacities and in addressing the root causes of armed conflict); Brahimi Report, supra note 36 at ¶137 ; UN 
General Assembly Resolution, 60/1, World Summit of 2005 (renewing the international community’s 
commitment to a “culture of conflict prevention” and pledge to strengthen the capacity of the UN for the 
prevention of armed conflict); Report of the Secretary-General, Proposed Programme Budget for the 
biennium 2008-09, A/62/521(2 November 2007).  
76 See OHCHR, “High Commissioner’s Strategic Management Plan 
2008-2009,” online:   
< http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/SMP2008-2009.pdf > which states as follows: 
Also, in carrying out the role assigned to OHCHR pursuant to the 2007 
UN Policy Committee decision on constitutional reform, the Office will 
follow up on its 2007 mapping of the UN system’s expertise in human 
rights and constitution-making.  A tool will be prepared with the 
objective of contributing to strengthening UN capacity in this area.   
Ibid. at 40 (Part 2). 
As of now, the OHCHR has compiled a set of documents and texts as reference and analytical guides for 
constitution-making, revising/drafting national legislation and strategies to consolidate human rights and 
democratic foundations.  See OHCHR, “Democracy and Human Rights” in Democracy and the UN at 3, 
online: <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/Democracy_Human_Rights_2008.pdf>;See generally OHCHR, 
Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States – Mapping the Justice Sector (New York: UN, OHCHR, July 
2006)]; Report of the Secretary-General, Strengthening of the Rule of Law, A/51/555, 25 October 1996 at 
para 3 (a) – (c) (explaining how the OHCHR assists in constitution-making). 
77 See Robert Husbands, Rule of Law & Democracy Unit, OHCHR, Geneva, email dated January 26, 2009. 
This short publication is expected to provide guidance to staff of OHCHR, and potentially others who are 
interested in providing assistance about the human rights aspects of constitutional issues and about how 
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Part II 
IV. Constitutional Assistance as a part of “Developmental Assistance”: 
 
 
But perhaps what is not widely known and not alluded to in the UN’s guidance note is 
that, today the UN also offers constitutional assistance as part of its “development 
assistance” under the wider “democratic governance” framework.79 In fact, as the account 
below shows, it slips such assistance into its wider development assistance and thereby 
avoids treading the inflammatory path of discounting (national) sovereignty and instead 
                                                                                                                                                 
they might wish to undertake technical assistance in this area when new constitutions are drafted or an 
existing constitution is amended. Ibid.  
78 See OHCHR, “Seminar to reinforce OHCHR’s capacity to provide constitutional assistance to states,” 
Geneva, Switzerland, (December 10-11, 2008) [on file with the author].  Plans are afoot to hold a second 
seminar towards the end of 2009 where the draft publication – to be developed by a consultant – will be 
reviewed and commented upon before it is finally released.  See Robert Husbands email, supra note 77.  
79 Interview of Jamal Benomar, supra note 43.  See generally UNDP, “Governance for Sustainable Human 
Development – A UNDP Policy Document” (1997), online: UNDP POGAR Democratic Governance 
<http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicydoc97-e.pdf>; Gita Welch and 
Zahra Nuru, “UNDP - Governance for the Future: Democracy and Development in the Least Developed 
Countries,” online: UNDP Democratic Governance < http://www.undp.org/governance/>; Mapping of 
Democratic Governance Projects that Support MDG Achievement, online: 
www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/Annex.xls> [visited August 24, 2009]; The Constitution and its 
Relationship to the Legislature, online: UNDP <www.undp.org/governance/docs/Parl-Pub-constution.htm> 
(listing UNDP constitution reform activities in Ecuador, Eritrea, Guyana and Tukaleau); Noha El-Mikawy, 
Democratic Governance Services: MDGs and Gender (Cairo, Egypt, 2005), online: < www.c2015as-
iln.org/files/cairo_july05_elmikawy_gender_governance.swf>:  
Slide 4 states: 
Policy Support Provided under the Democratic Governance Practice Area: 
Participatory Democratic Reform: 
• Electoral processes and electoral bodies 
  
Slide 7 states: 
How Do We Do It: 
Providing Assistance With: 
• Legal Framework (e.g. constitutional reform, Iraq, Sudan) 
….  [bold font in the original has been removed] 
For an account of how the post-World War II conception of “development” amounts to a continuation of 
colonial policies see “Helna Norberg-Hedge” in Nermeen Shaikh, ed., The Present as History: Critical 
Perspectives on Global Power  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) 17 at 17.  
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works in lockstep with it.  And the UNDP is emerging as the key player80 in this regard.  
It has provided constitutional assistance to the following countries: Bhutan, Democratic 
                                                 
80 Interview of Jamal Benomar, supra note 43. See e.g. Nicholas Rosellini, UN Resident Coordinator, Good 
Governance and Democracy, (October 15, 2007) online: 
<www.undp.org.bt/governance/docs/RC_on_grad07.ppt>.   
 UN’s Role in Democratic Governance 
• Supporting the rule of law 
• Support public administration reform  
• Build capacities of democratic institutions like the election commissions, anti-
corruption commissions.  
• Helps countries strengthen their electoral and legislative systems 
• Improve access to justice, public administration 
• Promotes human rights 
• Promotes participation and accountability 
Ibid. at Slide 10. 
What can the UN do to promote democratic governance? 
• Capacity development of constitutional bodies 
• Strengthening local governance through decentralization 
• Access to information through promotion of e-governance 
• Civil society and media 
• Civic participation   
Ibid. at slide 17 [emphasis added] 
Ensuring Credible and Quality Support to National Partners - The Practice Architecture, Bureau for 
Development Policy (BDP) (21 October 2008) online: < 
europeandcis.undp.org/uploads/public1/files/Regina...>:  
UNDP devotes the largest share of its resources – 40 percent or 
approximately US$1.5 billion each year – to making democratic 
governance deliver for the poor. This positions UNDP as one of the 
largest providers of democratic governance technical assistance in the 
world; we support an election somewhere in the world on average 
every two weeks and support one in every three parliaments around the 
world.  We are often –doing extraordinary things behind the scenes 
such as supporting the first free elections in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in over 40 years or helping Nepal to craft its new constitution. 
Ibid. [emphasis added] 
UNDP, UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund, (undated), at 17-18 online: 
<http://www.undp.org.> (stating that the UNDP supports “broad-based and participatory constitutional 
reviews and reforms” through the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund [DGTF]); “The 
Constitution and its relationship to the Legislature” (citing examples of “UNDP Constitutional Reform 
Activities” in Columbia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guyana and Tokelau): online, UNDP Publications, < 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/legis/constitutionpdf>; Bengt Save-Soderbergh & Izumi N. 
Lennartsson, “Electoral Assistance and democratization” in Hampson & Malone, From Reaction to 
Conflict Prevention, infra note 107, 357 at 361 (describing the democracy assistance provided by lower 
profile UN political offices with flexible mandates and which work closely with the UNDP’s UN Resident 
Coordinator and which “may thus have closer links with ‘good governance’ assistance”); Analysis of 
UNDP Elections Survey, (undated) online: 
<www.iknowpolitics.org/files/Analysis%20of%20UNDP%20Election%20Survey.doc> (a survey 
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Republic of Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Malawi, Maldives, 
Nauru,81 Solomon Islands, Tokelau82, and Zambia.  
 
Under this paradigm, the UN offers constitutional assistance as a “long-term” 
conflict-prevention measure where the idea is that socio-economic development has the 
powerful potential to prevent (armed) conflict and sustain peace.83  For instance, the UN 
                                                                                                                                                 
conducted in 2006 documenting the electoral assistance provided by the UNDP in various countries); UN 
Electoral Assistance – A System-Wide Endeavour, online: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/french/electoral_assistance/ea_content/ea_un_system.htm> (stating: 
Within the United Nations system, and in close consultation with the 
Electoral Assistance Division, UNDP plays an important role in 
providing technical support and assistance to electoral processes.  It 
engages with the countries in long-term capacity building and 
institutional building of the electoral bodies between elections. It plays 
a key role in aid coordination and in coordination of electoral assistance 
at election time. When United Nations electoral assistance is provided 
to a country, UNDP's Country Office plays the role of central support 
system of the UN system for such an undertaking. UNDP electoral 
assistance projects are executed using the array of modalities of 
execution currently available (DESA and OPS execution, national 
execution, execution by other agencies, etc.). [emphasis added] 
81 Nauru and Solomon Islands are island countries of the Pacific. The other island countries of this region 
are Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuata.    
82 See UNDP, Democratic Governance Factsheet, “People-centered Development,” online: UNDP Multi-
country Office Samoa, 
<http://www.undp.org.ws/OurWork/DemocraticGovernance/tabid/2039/language/en-US/Default.aspx> 
(“For Tokelau, an e-government project covering all telecommunications is linked to an overall good 
governance programme including drafting the constitution, strengthening the legal framework, 
training local authorities, and gender mainstreaming”); UNDP, “Focus Area – Democratic Governance,” 
online: UNDP Multi-country Office Samoa, “Focus Area – Democratic Governance,” < 
http://www.undp.org.ws/OurWork/DemocraticGovernance/tabid/2039/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.  
(stating that the UNDP’s democratic governance program in Tokelau included support in drafting the 
constitution, strengthening of the justice system and assisting Tokelau in holding wide consultations on the 
meaning of self-determination and decolonization); Tokelau, “Country Background,” online: UNDP Multi-
country Office Samoa, 
<http://www.undp.org.ws/OurWork/CountryProgramme/Tokelau/tabid/937/language/en-US/Default.aspx> 
(“Tokelauans are drafting a constitution and developing institutions and patterns of self-government as 
Tokelau moves toward free association with New Zealand). 
83Within the UN family, the UNDP adopted a conflict prevention strategy in November 2000 devoting 20 
per cent of its track 3 funding for “preventive and curative activities.”  See Role of UNDP in Crisis and 
post-conflict situations, D/P/2001/14, (November 2000) at ¶ 58, ¶4-15 (underscoring its commitment to 
link its development work to conflict prevention), ¶ 39 (underscoring its commitment to promote the rule of 
law since “violent conflict often arises when respect for the rule of law breaks down as a result of unsound 
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resident coordinator84 is expected to view humanitarian and development work through a 
“conflict-prevention” lens and make long-term (conflict) prevention a key focus of her 
work – a notion found appealing and consequently blessed by the Brahimi panel.85  In 
this context, the resident coordinator can identify the need for long-term conflict-
prevention measures such as gender-responsive constitutional reforms and could propose 
them to the government.    
 
Indeed, the UN’s increasing involvement in constitution-making can be traced to 
“the expectations that countries have of it to deliver on” its (twenty-first century) “global 
commitments” in the development landscape.86  For instance, UN country teams 
                                                                                                                                                 
or ineffective legal or constitutional systems”); UNDP Democratic Governance Group & Bureau for 
Development Policy, Elections and Conflict Prevention – A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming 
(undated) online: “UNDP Oslo Governance Center,” <http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/>  
84 UN resident coordinators are senior UN official cum designated representatives of the Secretary-General 
for developmental activities.  See also Report of the Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, 
A/55/985 (7 June 2001) at ¶ 99 (arguing that developmental assistance by itself cannot prevent or end 
conflict but it can however, “facilitate the creation of opportunities and the political, economic, and social 
spaces within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and use the resources necessary to build a 
peaceful, just, and equitable society”); Report of the Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention 
of Armed Conflict, A/60/891 (18 July 2006) at ¶ 93 (reporting that UN resident coordinators are “routinely 
invited” to address the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee on Peace and Security on long-term 
prevention issues and specific situations). 
85 See Brahimi Report, supra note 36 at ¶ 30. 
86 See United Nations, “Common Country Assessment and UN Development Assistance Framework: 
Guidelines for UN Country Teams on Preparing a CCA and UNDAF” (February 2009) at 2 online: < 
www.undg.org/.../CCA-and-UNDAF-Guidelines-FINAL-February-2009>[Hereinafter UNDAF-
Preparation Guidelines]; For long-term conflict prevention strategies of the UN see The Millennium 
Report of the Secretary-General of March 2000, the Brahimi Report, supra note 36 at ¶30. For a detailed 
analysis of the UN’s approach to long-term conflict prevention see Ralf Bredel, Long Term Conflict 
Prevention and Industrial Development (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) at 75-85; See also UN General 
Assembly Resolution 44/211, (22 December 1989), online: General Assembly 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa44.htm> (reaffirming NEX or the “national execution” principle, 
namely that “the operational activities of the UN system are carried out for the benefit of the developing 
countries, at the request of those countries, and in accordance with their own policies and priorities for 
development”)[emphasis added]; UN General Assembly Resolution 47/199 (22 December 1992) online: 
General Assembly< 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/276/41/IMG/N9327641.pdf?OpenElement (reiterating 
that “national execution should be the norm for programmes and projects supported by the UN system, 
taking into account the needs and capacities of recipient countries”); “National Execution: Promises and 
Challenges – Chapter II,” online:< http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/nec2.htm > (citing to UNDP 
Governing Council decision 93/25, 17 June 1993 which encouraged “greater use of UN specialized 
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(UNCTs)87 are primarily engaged in assisting governments to coin and shape their 
priorities in tune with their (governments’) international commitments and international 
human rights obligations.88  In short, UNCTs prepare UNDAFs solely to assist countries 
strengthen their “capacity” in all spheres.89  In this regard, a significant “opportunity” that 
“exists to place them (UNCTs) in a more strategic and influential position in a country’s 
(national) development context”90 - is when “major changes in government (of that 
country) are expected, for instance, through elections or a new constitution.”91 The UN’s 
constitutional assistance is thus deemed to be the essential link in a country’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
agencies in the design, technical appraisal and backstopping of nationally executed projects”); UNDP, 
“Procedures for National Execution, 1998,” online: 
<http://www.bi.undp.org/documents/NEX%20Procedures%20Manual.pdf>. 
87 UNCTs refer to the UN agencies, funds, and programmes working in a particular country, both resident 
and non-resident under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator. 
88 This constitutes the UN Development Assistance Framework or UNDAF.  See “What is UNDAF?” 
online: Human Rights in Development <http://www.unhchr.ch/development/mainstreaming-04.html>:   
UNDAF stands for the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework, a common program and resource framework for UN 
development agencies and programmes including, first and foremost the 
UN Development Group.  Its purpose is to maximize the development 
impact of United Nations assistance by introducing goal-oriented 
collaboration in response to national development priorities, and to 
enhance coordination among individual programmes. 
89 See UNDAF-preparation Guidelines, supra note 86 at 4.  “Capacity is defined as the ability of people, 
organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully.  Capacity development: the 
process whereby by people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and 
maintain capacity over time.”  Ibid. at 4, n.5.  Preparation of the UNDAF is “mandatory” for the UN 
Country Team unless the country is emerging from a crisis situation, in which case, the UN contribution 
may be to support a post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA).  Ibid. at 6.  See “UN Transitional Strategy 
Guidance Note” (2005), online: < www.undg.org/archive_docs/7388-
UN_Transitional_Strategy_Guidance_Note_-_DRAFT.doc>.   Clearly, constitutional assistance constitutes 
a component of the UN’s wider development assistance and is thus not restricted to only post-conflict 
situations.   
90 See “Annex I,” in UNDAF-preparation Guidelines, supra note 86 at 47. 
91 See “Annex I,” in UNDAF-Preparation Guidelines, supra note 86 at 48 [emphasis added]; Annex 1 titled 
“Potential Support by the UN system to enhance National Capacities for Development: A Mapping of 
Illustrative Activities,” in United Nations Development Group, “Enhancing the UN’s Contribution to 
National Capacity Development - A UNDG Position Statement” (2006) at 11 & 13, online: United Nations 
Development Group <http://www.undg.org/docs/7144/UNDG-Position-Paper-on-CD---FINAL-sent-out-
21-Dec-2006.pdf > [Hereinafter UNDG Position Statement]; See generally “UN Reform: Harmonization 
and Alignment to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals” (2005), online: < http://www.un-
kenya.org/UNReform.pdf>.  
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development-process chain.92 The idea is that meeting a country’s development 
challenges requires harnessing and strengthening its capacities in governance and 
political accountability - tasks for which the UN/UNDP - “a trusted partner” - is 
“uniquely placed” to help accomplish.93  Such assistance is also expected to promote and 
protect human rights in the country concerned - an essential pre-requisite to realize the 
UN Charter ideals.94   
 
                                                 
92 See e.g. “Role of the UN Malawi in a Changing Aid Environment – A Position Paper by the UN Country 
Team” (2006) at 6 online:< http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/9277-
Role_of_the_UN_Malawi_in_a_changing_aid_environment.pdf > [Hereinafter UN in Malawi: A Country 
Team Paper] 
The UN is fully aware of the need and scope for harnessing and 
strengthening of capacities, in public financial, human resource, results 
based management and monitoring and evaluation. … 
The UN is uniquely placed to strengthen capacities in governance and 
political accountability.  …  
93 UN in Malawi: A Country Team Paper, see ibid: 
 
The UN’s normative responsibilities and role as a trusted partner have 
led to, among other things, support in establishing constitutional and 
human rights bodies, designing and implementing the country’s 
decentralization programme and support on sensitive issues including 
elections, governance and political accountability, media freedom and 
access to information. Id. [emphasis added]. Ibid.  
 
 
UN Support to Government 
Specific areas of support that the UN can provide include: 
Implementation support, as part of overall capacity development 
efforts, including in sensitive areas such as procurement, elections and 
political governance; where surge capacity is required; and 
management of pooled funding mechanisms in situations where the 
beneficiary has yet to develop the capacity to manage and account for 
resources. Ibid. at 8.  [emphasis added but bold font is in the original] 
See UN Secretary-General, Millenmium Report, A/54/2000: 
Every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic 
growth is a step toward conflict prevention.  In many cases of internal conflict, 
poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavages, in which minority 
rights are insufficiently respected and the institutions of government are 
insufficiently inclusive.  Long term preventive strategies in such instances must 
therefore work “to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to 
institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.  …Every 
group needs to become convinced that the state belongs to all people.  Ibid. at 
45. 
94 Ibid.  See “Human Rights-Based Reviews of UNDP Programmes - Working Guidelines” (June 2003), 
online: <www.hurilink.org/tools/HRBAreviews_of_UNDP_Programmes_WorkingGuidelines03.pdf>- 
[UNDP Programmes Human Rights Guidelines] 
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Furthermore, UNCTs are urged to use the “unique opportunity of strategic 
importance” provided by Poverty Support Reduction Processes [PSRPs] by supporting 
the interventions therein.95  As we have seen in the paragraph above, a UNDAF process - 
and by extension, a country’s constitution-making process - offers a “key entry point” to 
the UNDP to provide its “capacities” (i.e., constitutional assistance).96  Given that the 
UNDP now uses the human rights conceptual framework for development97 and poverty 
reduction and the IFIs are no longer confined to the economic realm and are actively 
engaged in health, education, governance, corruption, human rights and civil society 
partnership, constitution-making moments are times where the philosophies and the core 
goals (development and human rights) of the UNDP and IFIs broadly converge - and in 
fact, are encouraged to do so.98   
                                                 
95 See UNDAF-Preparation Guidelines, supra note 86 at 10; UNDG, “Guidance Note - UN Country Team 
Engagement in PRSPs” (December 2003), online: <www.undg.org/archive_docs/3533-
2nd_PRSP_Guidance_Note_-_2nd_Guidance_Note.doc> [Engagement in PRSPs – Guidance Note]; Tim 
Jones & Peter Hardstaff, Denying Democracy - How the IMF and World Bank take Power from People 
(London: World Development Movement, 2005) at 6 (disclosing that following decades of protests and 
criticism over its structural adjustment credits and policies the World Bank renamed its various structural 
adjustment credits as “Poverty Reduction Support Credits” (PRSPs))[Hereinafter Denying Democracy]; 
“Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): A Rough Guide” (2003), online: Bretton Woods Project  
<http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/PRSP%20rough%20guide/PRSP%20rough%20gui
de.pdf> (stating that the IMF and the World Bank have “renamed” their lending facilities for poorer 
countries); IMF Factsheet, “Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,” online:< 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm>. 
96See UNDAF-Preparation Guidelines, supra note 86; UNDG Position Statement, supra note 91 at 4-5 11 
& 13 (Annex 1 “Potential Support by the UN system to enhance National Capacities for Development: A 
Mapping of Illustrative Activities,”); Bengt Save-Soderbergh & Izumi N. Lennartsson, “Electoral 
Assistance and Democratization” in Hampson & Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention, infra note 
107, 357 at 361 (describing the democracy assistance provided by lower profile UN political offices with 
flexible mandates and which work closely with the UNDP’s UN Resident Coordinator and “may thus have 
closer links with ‘good governance’ assistance”).  “Needs Assessments in the area of Constitutional Law: 
the Role of CCA/UNDAF processes,” was one of the topics on the agenda of the OHCHR Seminar on 
Constitution-Making, infra note 104.   
97 See UNDP Programmes Human Rights Guidelines, supra note 94; “The Application of a Human Rights-
Based Approach to Development Programming - What is the Added Value?,” 
online:<http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_Pub_AddedValue.pdf>; “Human Rights-based 
Approach to Development Programming in UNDP - Adding the Missing Link,” online: 
<http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_Pub_Missinglink.pdf> 
98 See UNDAF-Preparation Guidelines, supra note 86 at 10; Jones & Hardstaff, Denying Democracy, 
supra note 95 at 6; UN in Malawi -  A Country Team Paper, supra note 95 at 9 states: 
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Thus, the UNDP’s constitutional assistance may result either from its initiation of 
constitutional reform or when it targets an ongoing constitution-making process to apply 
its leverage.  Epitomizing the idea that sustainable development hangs on crisis 
prevention, the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) – “the most influential 
Bureau in UNDP on matters related to Rule of Law and constitutionalism” provides 
another thrust to UNDP’s fast widening role in constitutional assistance.99  Its focus on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Many donor organizations have locally resident international policy advisors 
and technical experts who among other things hope to influence the thinking and 
activities of government counterparts and other partners. … Some donors would 
prefer to be able to rely upon multilateral organizations such as the UN and the 
World Bank to engage with Government on priority policy issues… 
The World Bank is both a major donor and a member of the UN extended 
family. Given the scale of the challenges facing Malawi, the need for partnership 
between the two bodies is obvious, and the scope is wide, particularly in the 
social sectors, capacity development and implementation support. [emphasis 
added]. 
For definition of “capacity development” and “implementation support” see text of supra footnote 89; 
Engagement in PRSPs – Guidance Note, supra note 95 (containing Joint Letter Signed by Mr. Sherman 
Zhang, Managing Director of the World Bank and Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, Chair of the United Nations 
Development Group, to UN Resident Coordinators and World Bank Country Directors (May 5, 2003)) 
online:< www.undp.or.id/mdg/documents/Guidance%20for%20UNCT%20in%20PRSP.pdf > stating: 
 We are very pleased to see that the working partnership between  
the UN Resident Coordinators (along with the other members of the UNCT), 
and the World Bank Country Directors and/or Resident Representatives, has 
improved significantly in recent years.  It is obvious that the impact of the 
World Bank and the UN Agencies in support of poverty reduction is maximized 
when their efforts complement each other.  
 
… Indeed, we are seeing very positive results when the World Bank and UN 
Agencies work closely together in jointly supporting the PRSP process and 
building national capacity to monitor MDG programs.  
In a “post-conflict” context PRSPs or UNDAF processes are strategic frameworks for peace-building and 
are in short, “post-conflict development tools.”  See e.g. Vincent Kayijuka, “Strategic Framework for 
Peace-building in Burundi - Highlights and key Lessons Learned” Tokyo, (25 July 2008), online: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/seminar0807/burundi.pdf>: (SLIDES)  
Purpose of the Strategic Framework: 
It is the tool for bringing together the Government of Burundi and 
its partners – both national and international – around a shared set 
of peace-building objectives.  Ibid. at slide 6.  
99 Interview of Mr. Sudarshan, Policy Advisor - Legal Reform and Justice, UNDP Regional Center in 
Bangkok, Thailand by V. Sripati (March 21 & April 28, 2009).  See e.g. United Nations Development 
Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) Bureau Strategy 2007-2011 (January 
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putting in place institutions and systems of a durable nature, following breakdowns 
places it in the centre of national constitution-making efforts.100   
Part III 
V. The UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) 
 
The recent creation of the UNDEF101 to support “democratic dialogue” and 
“constitutional support” projects102 attests to the heightened attention constitutional 
assistance has received as a conflict-prevention and democracy-promotion tool.  A 
                                                                                                                                                 
2007) at 3, 18-19, online:< http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/47C5775A-F203-1EE9-
BBCAC96CECB11142>  (arguing that its “prevention interventions” are aimed at strengthening conflict 
prevention institutions and for this purpose lists facilitating national dialogue, supporting the design of 
constitutional processes, capacity building for ensuring constitutional, electoral and judicial reforms as its 
proposed “outcomes”); UNDP, Bureau for Conflict Prevention,  NHDR Thematic Guidance Note (August 
2004).  
100 Ibid.  Its mandate is to work on 'early recovery and development' in post-conflict situations.  Ibid.  See 
generally online: UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery, <http:www.undp.org/cpr/we_are/we_are.shtml>.  
As one of UNDP’s “key partners,” the World Bank engages actively with it on key post-construction tasks. 
Ibid. at online: “Our Partners,” UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 
<http:www.undp.org/cpr/we_are/we_are.shtml>.   
101 The key UN actors offering constitutional assistance include the Department of Public Affairs 
(UNDPA), the UNDP, UNIFEM, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and the Peace-Building Support Office (PBSO).   To ensure that it [UNDEF] works in lockstep with them, 
representatives from the DPA, DPKO, OHCHR, UNDP and UNIFEM) sit on the Policy Committee Group, 
one of UNDEF’s principal lobbying arms.   
102 The former UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan announced the creation of UNDEF as a UN General 
Trust Fund at the African Union Summit in 2005.  Its three main organs are the Advisory Board, the 
Programme Consultative Group (PCG) and the Office of the UN Democracy Fund.  The Advisory Board 
comprising 19 members (13 member states, four personal representatives of the Secretary-General and two 
representatives of non-governmental organizations) offers policy guidance to the Secretary-General on the 
Fund’s activities and funding guidelines.  The Secretary-General approves all funding proposals on the 
basis of recommendations received from the Advisory Board.   The UNDEF has six principal objectives 
and the remaining five are: civil society empowerment, civic education, voter registration and strengthening 
of political parties, human rights and fundamental freedoms, citizen’s access to information and 
accountability, transparency and integrity. See UNDEF, “UNDEF Programme Framework” (2006) at 8 
online: UN Democracy Fund < http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XProgrammeFramework.htm> As of 
December 31, 2006, UNDEF has funded 32 projects in the program area of “democratic dialogue and 
constitutional processes.” Ibid. at Annex II, UN General Assembly, United Nations Office for Partnerships: 
Report of the Secretary-General, (10 August 2007), A/62/220 online: UNHCR Refworld 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5990.html >.   For a complete list of projects funded through 
the UNDEF by programme area, see ibid. 
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majority of the constitution support projects approved by this fund are implemented by 
the UNDP, underscoring its dominance in this field.103      
VI. Conferences and workshops on Constitution-Making 
 
Yet another instance of the fundamental and high-level public international policy 
level-attention that constitutional assistance has received is the spate of conferences and 
workshops organized to discuss it.104  Their thrust has been to affirm the indispensability 
of the UN’s constitutional assistance but to reject the one-size-fits-all type of assistance 
and instead advocate its adaptation to suit different national needs.  For instance, the 
“Vienna Declaration on Building Trust in Government” [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] 
adopted at the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government in 2007105 affirmed that in 
post-conflict societies: 
                                                 
103 See UNDEF Short-Listed Proposals (document on file with the author). 
104 See e.g. “Seminar to reinforce OHCHR’s capacity to provide constitutional assistance to states,” 10-11 
December 2008, Geneva, Switzerland (organized by the OHCHR)(agenda on file); Public Seminar on 
"Challenges Ahead for United Nations Peace builders: Lessons from the Field and the New UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture," UN House, Tokyo, (July 25, 2008) online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/seminar0807/index.html>(co-organized by the United Nations 
Peace building Support Office (PBSO), the Hiroshima Peace builders Center (HPC), the United Nations 
University (UNU), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)); “7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government,” Vienna, Austria (26 – 29 June 2007) online: UN 
Public Administration Programme, 
<http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/7thGlobalForum/tabid/601/Default.aspx>;  “Aide 
Memoire” “Governance Challenges in Crisis and Post-Crisis Countries” at 1 online: 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN022878.pdf> (listing “constitution-
making” as the theme of one of the workshops to be held as a follow-up to the Forum’s plenary session). 
The ubiquity of UN jobs for constitution-making experts and/or constitution support managers also attests 
to the increasing responsibilities the UN is undertaking in supporting constitution-making and the policy 
attention constitutional assistance has received. 
105See “7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government” (26 – 29 June 
2007) Vienna, Austria, online: UN Public Administration Programme, 
<http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/GlobalForum/7thGlobalForum/tabid/601/Default.aspx>;  “Aide 
Memoire,” “Governance Challenges in Crisis and Post-Crisis Countries,” 7th Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government: Building Trust in Government, Vienna, Austria (26 – 29 June 2007) at 1 online: 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN022878.pdf>. The Global Forum was 
first organized by the Government of the United States in 1999.  Since then, it has emerged as one of the 
most significant global events to address government reinvention. Through Resolution A/RES/57/277, the 
General Assembly requested the United Nations Secretariat to provide support to the Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government.  Ibid.; “Workshop VII Final Report: Governance Challenges in Crisis & Post-
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Security sector reform, justice and reconciliation, 
constitution making, and conflict prevention 
through redistributive justice need to occur 
simultaneously and in harmony with one another.   
While setting up new institutions is extremely 
demanding, it is even more difficult for them to 
achieve legitimacy and to function effectively. 
Within this context, we emphasize that international 
assistance organizations should tailor their support 
to the specific needs of each post-conflict country. 
Support should be granted at each stage of the 
transition process and should involve all key 
stakeholders.106  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Today, far from ending its involvement in constitution-making, the UN declares 
constitutional assistance as a conflict prevention mechanism and thus its “core 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conflict Countries,” 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government, 
Vienna, Austria (26 – 29 June 2007), online: UN Public Administration Programme, 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan027842.pdf>. For insights into the  
explicit and implicit linkages between IFIs and post-conflict reconstruction see Dennis Rondinelli, 
“Restoring Governance in Post-conflict Countries: Challenges of International Assistance,” Capacity 
Development Workshop VII, 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government: Building Trust in 
Government, Vienna, Austria (26 – 29 June 2007), online: 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN025512.pdf>. For a candid 
assessment of the UN’s constitutional assistance in Afghanistan see Lakhder Brahimi, “State-Building in 
Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in 
Government” Vienna, Austria (26-29 June 2007), at 12, 16-17 online: < 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf>; UNDESA & UNDP, 
“The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries” – 7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government Building Trust  26-29 June 2007, Vienna, Austria (New York: United Nations, 
2007) at 39-48 online:< http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN025512.pdf > 
(identifying the diversity of constitution-making tasks and the challenges of strengthening constitutional 
government) 
106 See “The Vienna Declaration on Building Trust in Government,” “7th Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government: Building Trust in Government” (26-29 June 2007), online: UN Public Administration 
Programme <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan026677.pdf>; Report of the 
Secretary-General, Public Administration and Development, A/62/283, (21 August 2007) at Annex II 
(Vienna Declaration).  For a full report on the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government see ibid at ¶ 
26-36.  
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activity.”107   Indeed, it is poised to increasingly support constitution-making in the 
future,108 though the DPA remains vastly cash-strapped to carry out its widening 
responsibilities in this regard.109  But the most recent call for “further developments” to 
strengthen the UN’s mediation capacity from a high-level Security Council meeting and 
the UNDP’s widening role in supporting constitution-making evidences that 
internationalization of conflict prevention, and by extension, constitution-making - as a 
means of strengthening peace and security - has come to stay.110    
                                                 
107 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention of 
Armed Conflict, A/60/891 (18 July 2006) at paras 46-47, 89 & Annex, Section C “Core Prevention 
activities of the UN System” at 40 & 50 (listing electoral assistance and support to constitution-making 
processes as (conflict) prevention activities).  See also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) on conflict prevention, 
particularly in Africa, S/2008/18, (14 January 2008); Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Preventive Diplomacy at the 
UN (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (2008) at 164-174 [emphasis in original]; Michael S. Lund, 
“From Lessons to Action” in Fen Osler Hampson & David Malone eds., From Reaction to Conflict 
Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) at 159 & 
Appendix 7.1 “A Toolbox of Some Preventive Instruments” at 179 (listing constitutional assistance as a 
preventive instrument) [emphasis added];  Connie Peck, The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement 
System – Improving the Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996); B. G. Ramcharan, The International Law and Practice of Early Warning and 
Preventive Diplomacy: The Emerging Global Watch (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at 24-25 
108 See UN Guidance Constitution-making Note, supra note 7 at 1(stating that “the Organization is likely to 
be called upon in the future to assist other countries in their constitution-making processes”). 
109 See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General, Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008-09, 
A/62/521 (2 November 2007) at paras 2, 6, and 258 (underscoring the chronic “under-resourcing” of the 
Department of Political Affairs … (despite) its function “to provide advice on the political dimension of the 
many existing and emerging global issues including constitution-making, responsibility to protect human 
rights, transitional justice, gender….”) [emphasis added].   For “important concerns” of the Non-Aligned 
Group and the Third World at the UN’s active involvement in constitution-making, see Attachment to the 
Letter dated 7 March 2008 from the Permanent Representatives of Antigua and Barbuda and Cuba to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/C.5/62/24, (10 March 2008) (containing “proposals 
for a corrigendum to the report of the Secretary-General as contained in document A/62/521” one of which 
is to delete para 258). 
110 See “Secretary-General, former Top Special Adviser join High-level meeting as security council stresses 
importance of mediation in peaceful settlement of disputes” (Sept. 23, 2008), online: ReliefWeb 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7JSMM3?OpenDocument> (reporting that the UN 
Secretary-General has been called upon to submit a report on this topic).  For concept paper for the Security 
Council meeting on “Mediation and settlement of disputes” (23 September 2008), see online: 
<http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2008-590.pdf>.  For reprint of the Security Council Presidential 
Statement S/PRST/2008/ (23 September 2008), see ibid.  The following gist of the remarks made by the 
Croatian Prime Minister at this High-Level Security Council Meeting is interesting:  
The nature of contemporary conflict had changed from an 
“inter-State to intra-State level”, and the United Nations was now 
facing a different set of expectations and greater demand for its good 
offices and mediation.  Additionally, the Organization was required to 
deal not only with overcoming tensions between opponents or 
 35
This brief essay has established the emergence of the UN’s constitutional assistance 
as a “policy institution,” that is, an “established practice.”111  Indeed, as we have seen, 
today, the UN offers constitutional assistance to post-conflict countries typically through 
its peace operations and to others as a component of its “development assistance” under 
the “democratic governance” framework.  And practice has led theory in this regard 
which according to Dr. Roland Rich “is not unusual in the UN context.”112  The above 
account also disproves the UN’s claim that it assists countries write their constitutions 
only at their request.   
                                                                                                                                                 
belligerents, but also with offering solutions for transitional justice or 
constitution-writing, and designing mechanisms for wealth-sharing or 
human rights protections. [see ibid]. 
111 “Established practice” is just the ‘institution’ part of Wilde’s definition- and by extension mine - of 
‘policy institution.’  For UNCA to be a ‘policy institution’ it has to be shown that it [the practice of 
constitutional assistance] has been put to common policy ends.  For a detailed analysis of this theme see 
Vijayashri Sripati, “UNCA – A Mechanism for Implementing International Law and Policy” in The 
Evolution of the UN’s Constitutional Assistance: A Post-colonial and TWAIL Perspective The Evolution of 
the UN’s Constitutional Assistance: A Post-colonial and TWAIL Perspective at Chapter 5 (analyzing how 
UNCA can be understood and is indeed explained by the UN as a device for implementing international 
law) (in progress). 
112 Interview of Dr. Roland Rich, Executive Director, UNDEF by V. Sripati (October 24, 2008). [on file 
with the author]. 
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